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“AN INARTICULATE PREMISE INTUITIVELY FELT” 
Randall Tietjen† 
I was asked to offer some assessment or measure of Justice 
Simonett’s constitutional decision making, and I foolishly agreed.  I 
only started practicing law a few years before Justice Simonett 
retired from the court, so I have no personal experience on which 
to rely.  I only met him a couple of times, briefly, and we never 
talked about weighty subjects like constitutional law.  He is 
someone I knew only by reputation.  Doris Simonett once 
interviewed me on her Law in Action cable show.  Based on that 
experience, I can probably say that I have spent more time talking 
with Doris than with her husband. 
Once in the mid-1990s, I conducted a two-hour oral history of 
Walter Rogosheske for the supreme court.  Walter was a dear, dear 
man.  Many of you must have known him.  He was John Simonett’s 
next-door neighbor in Little Falls.  He had been a trial-court judge 
when Justice Simonett was practicing law there, and later, Justice 
Simonett took Walter’s seat on the supreme court—a seat known as 
the Little Falls seat.  Walter spoke very highly—glowingly, 
lovingly—of John Simonett, but knowing Walter was not a 
substitute for knowing John Simonett. 
So to get to know Justice Simonett I did what I would now 
recommend all lawyers do, especially lawyers around my age or 
younger who never knew him: I dug into his writings.  (And I 
collected some data, which I’ll get to later.)  I read all of his 
speeches, those that I could find.  He gave a great many speeches.  
Many of them have been collected by the State Law Library, copies 
of which Tom Boyd kindly loaned to me.  And I read all of his 
articles and essays—what you might call his non-judicial writings.  
And, of course, I read many of his opinions, particularly in the area 
 
       †  Randall Tietjen is a partner in the Minneapolis office of the law firm of 
Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi L.L.P.  These are edited remarks that he made at a 
daylong CLE at William Mitchell College of Law on March 23, 2012, honoring the 
legal career of John Simonett.  He would like to thank Jennifer Doyle and Barbara 
Stevens for their help with these written remarks. 
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of constitutional law.  I also watched a video of an oral history of 
Justice Simonett—a wonderful interview—that was conducted by 
his daughter Martha in 1997. 
Before I get into what I found, I’ll tell you this: if you do what I 
did, you will be inspired to be a better lawyer.  I can almost 
guarantee it.  You will find in Justice Simonett someone you cannot 
help but deeply admire.  You will find a lawyer whom you will 
immediately like and whom you will likely never forget.  You will 
find a lawyer who had a deep appreciation for all of humanity—
someone who had as much admiration for the skills and wisdom of 
a talented carpenter and repairman as he did for any intellectual, 
but someone who was, himself, a great intellectual.  You will 
immediately appreciate his love of history and of literature and 
poetry.  He quoted these to great effect in his speeches and 
writings.  And he quoted them in a way that you know came from a 
lifetime of reading and not from Bartlett’s.  You will also see a clarity 
and style in his writing that is worth trying to imitate.  And you will 
see an enviable wit—in the classic American style.  What a 
marvelous thing it must have been to have John Simonett as a 
father. 
But what did I learn about Justice Simonett as a jurist and as a 
constitutional decision maker?  Well, I decided to approach this 
subject, in part, like a social scientist might—an amateur social 
scientist.  I have always enjoyed the articles that the American 
Judicature Society publishes in its magazine—where the authors try 
by some statistical measurement to determine what type of 
decisions a court is turning out and on what basis and how the 
judges are getting along together.  So, I started my investigation of 
Justice Simonett by looking at his decisions over his entire career 
on the court, from 1980 to 1994.  I’ll tell you some of what I found. 
By my count (using LexisNexis), he was responsible for 
approximately 355 majority opinions (this excludes orders that list 
him as author, of which there are nearly two hundred).1  In his first 
full calendar year on the court—1981, when the court was turning 
out hundreds of opinions a year—he was responsible for forty-six 
 
 1.  See Summary of Opinions by John E. Simonett, in THE JUDICIAL                      
CAREER OF JOHN E. SIMONETT ch. 4 (Marvin Roger Anderson & Susan K.                  
Larson eds., 1998), available at http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/judges 
/simonettopinions.pdf (containing a useful list of Justice Simonett’s opinions and 
some statistics that differ somewhat from my own numbers, which are based on 
LexisNexis searches). 
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majority opinions.  That was his highest number in any calendar 
year.  With the exception of 1984, when he turned out forty-two 
majority opinions, his numbers decreased over time, but the 
number of decisions by the court overall also decreased, as the 
court of appeals came into being.  In his last full year on the court, 
in 1993, he turned out twenty-one majority decisions, writing no 
dissents and only two concurrences. 
He was not an active dissenter.  That distinction—during 
Justice Simonett’s years on the court—might be said to go to Justice 
Yetka, who nearly every year between 1980 and the 1990s filed 
more dissents, I believe, than any other justice, although in some 
years George Scott or Rosalie Wahl, and later Jeanne Coyne, would 
top him.  In 1982, for example, Justice Yetka filed thirty-seven 
majority opinions and dissented twenty-eight times.  During Justice 
Simonett’s years on the court, Justice Yetka filed or joined a total of 
180-some dissents, while Justice Simonett, over his career, filed or 
joined a dissent just forty-seven times, if you count those in which 
he was also concurring in part.  The number of Justice Simonett’s 
dissents were in line with Chief Justice Amdahl’s; when they were 
on the court together, they each dissented roughly the same 
number of times: zero to five or six times each year (although 
Justice Simonett dissented eight times in 1981, including one 
dissent where he also concurred in part). 
The numbers on concurrences are a little different.  Justice 
Yetka, I believe, concurred only forty-three times (including when 
he concurred in part and dissented in part) over the years in which 
he and Justice Simonett were both on the court.  Justice Simonett 
and Justice Wahl concurred or joined a concurrence roughly the 
same number of times, with Justice Simonett coming in at forty-six 
and Justice Wahl at forty-eight, also counting those concurrences in 
which they were also dissenting in part. 
Now, I’m just giving you some raw statistics, of course (and, 
depending on how the opinions are counted, someone else might 
come up with other numbers).  To search for explanations for 
these numbers would be a much more complicated task.  The 
explanations might vary from year to year and from case to case.  
There are lots of reasons why a justice might dissent and concur in 
a decision.  Judges, I’m sure, have different ideas about when a 
dissent or concurrence is proper or necessary.  Ideological 
differences—fundamental differences in ideas about how our 
system of laws and justice should work, the rights people should 
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enjoy, and the role of the courts—I would assume account for 
many differences between majority and dissenting opinions. 
With respect to concurrences, Justice Simonett offered an 
interesting explanation in his oral history on when he might write a 
concurring opinion.  He said that if he wrote a dissent, it was 
unlikely that five years later the court would say, “You know what, 
we were wrong.  We adopt the earlier dissent of Justice Simonett.”  
But if he wrote a concurrence—ah, if he wrote a concurrence—five 
years hence he might have some influence on the direction of the 
law. 
Now how often, you might be wondering, did other justices 
dissent from Justice Simonett’s opinions?  Of the 355 majority 
opinions that Justice Simonett wrote, 280-some involved no dissent 
of any sort, although some of those involved concurrences.  So 
roughly eighty percent of the time, Justice Simonett wrote for a 
unanimous court.  I don’t know how that record compares to his 
colleagues on the court.  That would have taken some lengthy 
calculations for which I didn’t have time.  But unanimity eighty 
percent of the time is a much better record than the U.S. Supreme 
Court, as a whole, can achieve.  Ruth Bader Ginsburg published an 
essay in the Minnesota Law Review a year or so ago on the role of the 
dissent.  She reported that the U.S. Supreme Court, overall, was 
able to achieve a dissent-free opinion only nineteen percent of the 
time in one recent term.2 
Who were the most active dissenters from Justice Simonett’s 
majority opinions?  Perhaps this is no surprise: Justices Yetka and 
Wahl—they dissented twenty-nine and thirty-four times, 
respectively.  So, a little less than ten percent of the time either 
Justice Yetka or Justice Wahl or both were dissenting from Justice 
Simonett’s opinions.  (Of course, they were not the only ones who 
dissented.)  That number doesn’t strike me as a particularly high 
percentage. 
So now what about Justice Simonett’s opinions on 
constitutional law?  I found approximately fifty-three majority 
opinions on constitutional law.  Of course, what represents a 
constitutional-law opinion is not necessarily a simple matter in 
itself.  Justice Simonett wrote decisions on issues of standing and 
jurisdiction, for example, that might, under someone’s definition, 
 
 2.  Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Role of Dissenting Opinions, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1, 1 
(2010). 
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constitute opinions on constitutional law, having to do with the 
concept of due process.  I excluded those from my count and 
looked for opinions concerning his interpretation or application of 
some specific provision of the federal or state constitution, in 
response to some statute or rule or government action. 
In addition to fifty-three majority opinions, I found two 
concurrences (although he joined a few others) based on some 
constitutional analysis, and only three dissents (although, again, he 
joined a few others).  Often what Justice Simonett did with a 
concurrence or dissent—with a couple of notable exceptions—was 
offer a means of resolving the matter without reaching the 
constitutional issue.  This is consistent with Judge Lansing’s 
remarks about Justice Simonett’s approach to the constitution.  He 
seemed to have a cautious view of the role of constitutional law in 
judicial decision making. 
Of the fifty-three majority opinions written by Justice Simonett, 
most of them (some sixty-five percent) were civil cases, and the 
subject on which he wrote the most opinions was equal protection.  
Twenty or more of his majority and concurring opinions were on 
the subject of equal protection.  His equal-protection analyses, you 
will see, if you take some time to read them, are models of clarity, 
and they have been cited often in later decisions. 
From his fifty-three majority opinions on constitutional issues, 
there were fourteen dissents.  The most active dissenters, as you 
might imagine, were Justice Yetka and Justice Wahl—mostly Justice 
Wahl.  In virtually every constitutional case in which Justice Wahl 
dissented from a majority decision by Justice Simonett, Justice 
Simonett was upholding the constitutionality of a statute or 
criminal search or government takings, and Justice Wahl was 
disagreeing with the government’s conduct or the legislature’s 
statute.  This is not that surprising, and I think it is some further 
evidence of what I would call their ideological differences. 
When Justice Simonett was writing for the majority on a 
constitutional issue, he usually upheld the constitutionality of the 
statute being challenged or the conduct of the government action 
under review.  This is what you would expect to see from a careful, 
thoughtful, moderate judge—cautious, deferential, and, at times, 
pragmatic in his decision making.  Nothing earth shaking.  Nothing 
rigid.  No right wing.  No left wing.  And certainly no incivility or 
arrogance or cutting remarks about how the constitution should be 
interpreted, as we have seen among some justices of other courts. 
5
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But even a moderate has his limits when it comes to the 
constitutional conclusions he must reach, and Justice Simonett 
wrote approximately twelve decisions, either as majority opinions 
or concurring opinions, where he concluded that a statute or rule 
or government action was unconstitutional. 
 He found an attachment statute violated procedural due 
process because it permitted attachment without any notice or 
hearing on the mere showing that the debtor owned or had an 
interest in property that might be applied to the satisfaction of 
a judgment.3 
 Under the contracts clause, he found unconstitutional a 
statute that retroactively changed the age eligibility for a 
pension.4 
 He found no rational basis for treating vendors of 3.2 beer any 
differently than vendors of intoxicating liquor.5 
 He found that a criminal defendant’s right to represent 
himself required a new trial.6 
 He decided that a residence-duration requirement for general 
assistance benefits violated the right to travel and equal 
protection.7 
These were some of the rights he upheld and statutes he found 
unconstitutional.  But he decided many other constitutional issues, 
including Miranda issues, substantive-due-process issues, separation-
of-powers issues, search-and-seizure issues, establishment-clause 
issues, and full-faith-and-credit issues, among others.  In almost 
every case, his decision was grounded in the Federal Constitution, 
almost never the state constitution. 
I combed through these decisions to see if I could find some 
pattern or method or underlying philosophy in his constitutional 
decision making.  I didn’t find one.  At least not one that is easy to 
identify or articulate. 
In some instances, he relied on the text of the Constitution; in 
some instances, on precedent.  In some instances, he seemed to be 
influenced to some degree by the historical context of the 
constitutional language at issue, but he was never much concerned 
 
 3.  Olson v. Ische, 330 N.W.2d 710 (Minn. 1983). 
 4.  Christensen v. Minneapolis Mun. Emps. Ret. Bd., 331 N.W.2d 740 (Minn. 
1983). 
 5.  Johnson v. Moberg, 334 N.W.2d 411 (Minn. 1983). 
 6.  State v. Richards, 456 N.W.2d 260 (Minn. 1990). 
 7.  Mitchell v. Steffen, 504 N.W.2d 198 (Minn. 1993). 
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about discovering the “original intent.”  He sometimes cited 
commentators.  He always, as Judge Lansing said, “showed his 
work.”  He let the reader see how he had reasoned through the 
issue. 
This had me a little stumped.  How could I summarize his 
philosophy of constitutional decision making?  And then I read a 
marvelous essay that he wrote for the William Mitchell Law Review in 
1984, several years after he was appointed to the bench.8  The 
subject of the essay was how the term “result-oriented” is used to 
characterize appellate decisions.  But in the course of this essay, he 
wrote something very revealing about how appellate judges make 
their decisions.  It confirms what we lawyers might have always 
suspected: that it’s not as logical and predictable as some would 
have us believe.  At the risk of reading too much to you, here, at 
some length, is what he said: 
While the published opinion is the best evidence and 
normally the only evidence available of the court’s 
thinking, it may not truly be revealing of what influenced 
the court.  The typical appellate opinion in its published 
form marches along in an orderly fashion, but it should 
come as no surprise that the court, consciously or 
unconsciously, may not be setting out all the factors that 
entered into its decision.  In their written opinions, judges 
are not necessarily expected to state the reasons for 
deciding as they did, but only to justify their decision with 
reasoning that is respectable and authorities that are 
appropriate. 
       The published opinion may march inexorably 
forward step-by-step toward a conclusion, but it is unlikely 
that the judge’s mental processes proceeded in that 
manner.  Rather than to march forward, it is likely that 
the human mind (to switch metaphors) tends to hover, 
until finally, it alights on a conclusion.  “General 
propositions do not decide concrete cases,” said Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, adding, “[t]he decision will 
depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle than any 
articulate major premise.”  The key notion here is that of 
inarticulateness.  What may seem to be reasoning 
backwards from a desired result may be a normal process 
of reasoning from an inarticulate premise intuitively felt 
 
 8.  John E. Simonett, The Use of the Term “Result-Oriented” to Characterize 
Appellate Decisions, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 187 (1984). 
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but nevertheless real and meritorious.9 
So there you have it: “an inarticulate premise intuitively felt.”  
An innate sense of what would be just and wise, might be another 
way to put it.  This is something, I’ve come to believe, a person 
cannot usually possess until having lived fifty or more years. 
Because constitutional law is often a matter of deciding how 
much individual liberty should be allowed, I would like to play for 
you a clip (but, here, provide a transcript) from the oral history of 
Justice Simonett in 1997, which was conducted by his daughter 
Martha, as I mentioned earlier.  In this clip, Justice Simonett is 
describing the court’s decision in State v. Hershberger.10  I’ll leave it to 
him to describe the case, but note at the end of the clip his 
reference to a line by Robert Frost about “liberty” (or “freedom,” 
which may have been the word Frost used) defined as “being easy 
in the harness.”  It was something he often used to describe the 
tension between the duties and responsibilities we have as citizens 
and the rights and privileges we should also enjoy. 
J. Simonett:  State v. Hershberger.  There’s a community of 
Old Amish down in Fillmore County.  They drive around 
their black buggies, and the state had a statute for slow-
moving vehicles.  They had to affix to the rear of the 
buggy this slow-moving vehicular sign.  You’ve seen them, 
Martha, this—this fluorescent triangle—as you go through 
our home county of Morrison late in the evening and 
come over a gravel hill, and you see that hay wagon going 
home pulled by the tractor.  We had more than one 
lawsuit involving accidents like that. 
       Anyway, so here was this slow-moving sign the 
legislature said all slow-moving vehicles had to have to 
promote safety on the highway.  Well, the Old Amish 
refused.  They were arrested. They wouldn’t put ‘em on.  
As they read scripture, it was forbidden to their religion.  
These were worldly symbols.  And the tricky part of it was, 
it wasn’t all the Amish.  There were a lot of the Amish 
down there that would put those triangular signs on their 
black buggies.  Only these few, the Old Amish, would not.  
And the case wound its way up to our court and Justice 
Kelley wrote the decision, and he applied the First 
Amendment law of the United States Constitution and 
said that the statute violated—the Minnesota statute 
 
 9.  Id. at 193–94 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted). 
 10.  462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990). 
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violated—the free exercise of religion and set aside the 
conviction. 
       So Fillmore County appeals the case to the United 
States Supreme Court.  While it was up there pending, 
that court decided another case, and it reversed the 
Minnesota Supreme Court—think of that, Martha, we got 
reversed—and sent it back and said that the Minnesota 
statute did not violate the Federal Constitution, that this 
was a traffic statute, neutral in its application—general 
application to all.  And you know, if you’re driving to 
church on Sunday and you exceed the speed limit, do you 
think you can avoid being convicted on the grounds you 
were trying to get to church on time?  [Pause.]  I’m asking 
you a question, Martha. 
M. Simonett:  It’s a rhetorical question. 
J. Simonett:  No.  Anyway, they sent it back to us, and this 
time we took the case.  It was argued again, assigned again 
to Justice Kelley, and we decided it under our state 
constitution and held that the statute as applied to the 
Old Amish violated our liberty of conscience clause in our 
state constitution.  Well, I thought about that case a lot.  I 
think it illustrates—it illustrates how the law will 
accommodate all the people in this country of such 
diverse interests and identities.  It could just as well have 
gone the other way.  It’s only a few farmers down there.  
Safety first.  But the law goes out of its way to 
accommodate these people in their individual beliefs.  
The individual counts in a democracy.  I thought that case 
illustrated it very well.  I thought about it a number of 
times and as far as I know there haven’t been any car-
buggy collisions down in Fillmore County.  It works out 
well. 
       The other side—I often use, you know, that line from 
Robert Frost when he says liberty—he defined liberty as 
being easy in the harness.  And that’s about it.  You gotta 
give people room to do their own thing.  Yet the people 
gotta remember that they wear a harness.  The law 
imposes responsibilities as well as gives privileges.  End of 
speech. 
Hershberger is one of the cases in which Justice Simonett wrote a 
concurring opinion. 
Now, there is just one other clip that I would like to play for 
you (but here, again, provide a transcript), and then I will be 
9
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finished.  I would much rather listen to Justice Simonett than 
myself.  This clip relates to the Minnesota Constitution. 
As I mentioned, relatively few of Justice Simonett’s opinions 
involved the state constitution.  My sense is that Justice Simonett—
being a judge in the 1980s and early 1990s, when we were just on 
the cusp of a broader interest by state courts in their own 
constitutions as a source of protection for liberties—did not want to 
jump enthusiastically into the subject without some considerable 
thought. 
He used to say that in his first years of practice he had the 
habit of taking his glasses off and carefully cleaning them for a bit 
after clients asked him a question.  This gave him time to think, he 
said, without looking like he didn’t know the answer.  He also said 
that he never would have been able to get through the first years of 
practice if he had worn contact lenses. 
I think Justice Simonett’s approach to issues about the state 
constitution was similar.  In his last years on the court, he was still 
polishing his glasses.  He was still thinking about what direction we 
might want to go.  The fact that he never seemed to believe it was 
urgent to interpret and apply the state constitution more broadly 
while he was still on the court is probably testament to his wisdom. 
In any event, this last clip is just a fun story, but it involves a 
provision of our state constitution. 
J. Simonett:  Well, when we moved into this new 
Minnesota Judicial Center—if you look out on the plaza 
and—there’s a granite wall that extends in a north-south 
direction.  It’s got open window spaces in it.  And the 
architect called that on the plans the “Dedicatory Wall.”  
It’s going to be dedicated.  And he explained that we’d 
have our names carved in stone forevermore in there.  
Think of that, Martha. 
       And we could have—the governor could have his 
name in there.  And we could—maybe we could get 
legislative leaders.  And the architect could have his name 
on the Dedicatory Wall.  And we were—so we had a 
meeting and conference one day, and we had to narrow 
down the names.  We only had so much wall.  And I had 
the happy suggestion, at least I thought it was, I said, 
“Here, let’s have no names.  Let’s have a quotation from 
our state constitution.”  Now, everybody would say, “Hey, 
if we’re gonna quote a constitution, let’s quote the federal 
one.”  But really, we’re a state supreme court.  This 
10
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building here houses the state supreme court.  And we 
should have some reminder to the public of this fact.  
They all agreed.  And I said, “I have something in mind.”  
And that’s article I, section 8.  I happen to have it right 
here.  Article I, section 8: “Every person is entitled . . . to 
obtain justice freely and without purchase, completely and 
without denial, promptly and without delay, conformable 
to the law.”  Hasn’t that got a nice cadence to it? 
M. Simonett:  That says it all. 
J. Simonett:  No, it doesn’t.  No it doesn’t, Martha.  If you 
go out there and look at that wall, it—it says, where it 
says . . . . 
M. Simonett:  I will when we leave. 
J. Simonett:  “Every person is entitled,” and then there’s 
three dots.  And then it’s picked up, “to obtain justice,” to 
indicate that something was left out.  Ask me a question. 
M. Simonett:  And what was left out? 
J. Simonett:  Yes.  This: “Every person is entitled to a 
certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs which 
he may receive to his person, property or character.”  That 
was dropped. 
M. Simonett:  Why? 
J. Simonett:  Do you have a question, Martha? 
M. Simonett:  Why was it dropped? 
J. Simonett:  Well, I can remember, again, Justice Glenn 
Kelley, saying “Gosh,” he said, “you know, that’s a 
wonderful quote you got there.”  But the part I just—the 
clause I just read you is called the “certain remedies” 
clause.  And there’s a number of Minnesota Supreme 
Court decisions interpreting that.  And it’s precatory in its 
influence.  It’s inspirational.  You can’t take the language 
so literally to say that everybody has a certain remedy for 
every wrong that happens to you.  It has to be a remedy 
within the body and tradition of the law.  And Justice 
Kelley was worried if we put that up on the wall, people 
are going to read it before they came into court and say, 
“Here, I’m entitled to a remedy.  Let’s have it.”  See?  And, 
so anyway—that’s part of it. 
M. Simonett:  Oh, that’s interesting. 
J. Simonett:  Yeah, it is.  And I think in the last few years I 
was on the court that the state constitution was becoming 
more and more influential as the Federal Supreme Court 
tended not to expand civil liberties to the extent that 
11
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some state supreme courts thought they might under 
their state constitutions. 
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